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1. Introduction 
The right of self-determination of peoples has been described as ‘perhaps the most 
controversial and contested of the many controversial and contested terms in the 
vocabulary of international law.’1 The difficulties in determining the exact meaning of 
self-determination, as well as promoting a coherent implementation thereof, stem 
from the combination of two elements: first, a certain ambiguity in the way 
international legal instruments have articulated this right,2 and, secondly, the fact that 
political and moral considerations crucially influence its realisation.3  
 Against this unsettled background, the self-determination claims of sub-
national groups have become particularly problematic for both the States concerned 
and the international community.4 It should be recalled that, during the process of 
decolonization, self-determination was generally equated with independence. More 
precisely, it was understood as the right of peoples of non-self-governing territories 
and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation to create their 
                                                
1 James Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and 
Future”, in Philip Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights (2000) p. 7.  
2 For general discussions of self-determination, see Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A 
Legal Reappraisal (1995), and James Summers, Peoples and International Law: How the Right of Self-
Determination and Nationalism Shape a Contemporary Law of Nations (2007). 
3 On this point, see, among others, Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: 
Moral Foundations for International Law (2004), pp. 332-400; Richard Falk, Human Rights Horizons: 
The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World (2000) pp. 98-125; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (1990); Yash Ghai 
(ed.) Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States (2000); Wolfgang 
Danspeckgruber, “Self-Determination, Self-Governance, and Security”, 15 International Relations 
(2000) pp. 11-21. 
4 The term ‘sub-national groups’ is used to refer to national/ethnic, religious and linguistic groups who 
live within the border of a State and claim to be a ‘people’ for the purposes of self-determination. 
Crucially, the question of who is a ‘people’ has never found a definitive answer under international 
law. See, for example, Reference re Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 
217, para. 123. For a discussion of the meaning of the term ‘people’, see the UNESCO report 
produced, in 1989, by an international meeting of experts. SHS-89/CONF.602/7. 
own State.5  Crucially, the ‘whole peoples’, and not segments thereof, were entitled to 
exercise this right. With the end of colonization, however, self-determination began to 
acquire a different meaning. Recognizing the continuing character of the right, 
instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
gradually extended the applicability of self-determination to all peoples.6 This led to 
the modern distinction between the internal and external aspects of self-determination, 
which, as a consequence, has ceased to be linked exclusively to the idea of 
independence.7 In this new context, the recognition of sub-national groups as 
beneficiaries of the right of (internal) self-determination has been increasingly 
supported both by academics8 and judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.9 According to 
this view, sub-national groups should have the right to freely pursue ‘their political, 
economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing 
State.’10 The majority of States, however, have been rather cautious in endorsing this 
view, fearing that secessionist groups living within their borders would understand 
this self-determination in accordance with the ‘secessionist overtones’11 typical of the 
decolonisation period. Not surprisingly, international legal instruments have thus far 
refrained form expressly recognising a right of (internal) self-determination to 
segments of a population, indicating that the validity of sub-national groups’ claims 
                                                
5 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in respect of 
Kosovo (Kosovo Opinion), International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, para. 79. 
See, in particular, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA 
Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960. It should be noted, however, that independence was only 
one of the available options for the peoples concerned. See, Principles which Should Guide Members 
in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for under 
Article 73(e) of the Charter, Annex, Principle VI, GA Resolution 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960. 
6 Antonio Cassese, supra note 2, pp. 59-62. 
7 Ibid.,  pp. 52-65. 
8 For example, Robert McCorquodale, “Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach”, 43 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) pp. 857-885; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It (1995) pp. 121-128; Thomas Musgrave, Self-
Determination and National Minorities (2000) pp. 188-199 and 258; Allen Buchanan, supra note 3, pp. 
332-400; Antonio Cassese, supra note 2, pp. 348-359; Gaetano Pentassuglia, “State Sovereignty, 
Minorities and Self-Determination: A Comprehensive Legal View”, 9 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights (2002) pp. 303-324. 
9 See, for example, General Comment No. 12: The right to Self-determination of Peoples (13 March 
1984); Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
Comm. No. 75/92 (1995); General Recommendation No. 21: Right of Self-Determination (23 August 
1996), Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/comments.htm; Reference re Secession of Quebec, 
Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 217. 
10 Emphasis mine. Reference re Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 217, 
para. 126. 
11 Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 American Journal of 
International Law (1992) p. 54. 
for this right remains relatively uncertain under current international law.  
 A related, and, perhaps, more controversial issue, is that of remedial secession. 
International law does not recognise a right to independence to sub-national groups. 
If, however, one accepts that these groups have the right to internal self-
determination, what would happen if they fell victim of serious injustices such as, for 
example, the systematic violation of their basic human rights? According to some 
authors, in such extreme circumstances these groups should be entitled to a right to 
independence as a last resort.12 From a moral perspective, this would arguably 
represent the most sensible solution. In practical terms, however, this means that some 
secessionist claims could still be ultimately validated, in violation of the principle of 
territorial integrity jealously protected by both States and the international 
community. Not surprisingly, there is no evidence of clear support for this right under 
international law. On the one hand, States have different views on this critical issue,13 
often succumbing to realpolitik when dealing with remedial secession claims;14 on the 
other hand, no international legal document has thus far expressly referred to the 
existence of this right.  
 Against this background, it has been argued that the adoption of the 2007 UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP or the Declaration) 
constituted a major development in the international law of self-determination.15 The 
key provision of the UNDRIP concerning self-determination is found in Article 3, 
which affirms that: 
 
‘indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.’ 
 
                                                
12 For example, Robert McCorquodale, Thomas Musgrave, and Allen Buchanan, supra note 8; Antonio 
Cassese, supra note 2, pp. 359-362 
13 Kosovo Opinion, supra note 5, para. 82.  
14 See, Christopher Borgen, “The Language and the Practice of Politics: Great Powers and the Rhetoric 
of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia”, 10 Chicago Journal of International 
Law (2009) pp. 1-33; Richard Falk, “The Kosovo Advisory Opinion: Conflict Resolution and 
Precedent”, 105 American Journal of International Law (2011) pp. 50-59. 
15 Quane, for one, has recently commented that ‘the Declaration may represent one of the most 
significant stages in the development of the right to self-determination since decolonisation.’ Helen 
Quane, “New Directions for Self-Determination and Participatory Rights?”, in Stephen Allen and 
Alexandra Xanthaki (eds.) Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2011) p. 260. 
This is a straightforward endorsement of the right of self-determination for indigenous 
peoples. Against the uncertainties that surround the scope of self-determination under 
international law, it becomes important to determine the exact meaning and 
implications of this provision. Does it confer on indigenous peoples a full right of 
self-determination, including a right to secession, or, at least, to remedial secession? 
Or does it simply refer to a right of ‘internal’ self-determination? And, in the latter 
case, what would this practically mean for indigenous peoples? 
 This article will seek to answer the above questions by examining the drafting 
history of Article 3 of the UNDRIP and positioning it within the (broader) normative 
context of the Declaration. The next two sections will examine the different ways in 
which indigenous peoples and States approached the question of self-determination 
during the negotiation process. In doing so, they will discuss whether the UNDRIP is 
compatible with an expansive reading of self-determination which would also include 
a right to secession. Section four, instead, will focus specifically on remedial 
secession, seeking to assess the UNDRIP’s overall position on this contentious issue. 
After that, section five will explore the actual meaning of the indigenous right to self-
determination, highlighting its ‘internal’ character and strong relationship with 
participatory rights. Finally, section six will seek to draw some final conclusions on 
the potential and limits of this understanding of self-determination for indigenous 
peoples. 
 
 
2. The Right of Self-Determination in the 1993 UN Draft Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Despite the predictable difficulties in obtaining an express recognition of the right of 
self-determination, the indigenous peoples’ representatives who took part in the 
negotiations on the UNDRIP were not prepared to accept any compromise on this 
particular issue. Indeed, that self-determination was central to their claims became 
clear since the very beginning of the drafting process, which was initiated in the mid 
1980s by the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP).16 As soon as 
the WGIP commenced considering the content of a declaration on indigenous rights, a 
                                                
16 The WGIP was a subsidiary body of the (then) Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities. It was established pursuant UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 
1982/34 of 7 May 1982. 
number of indigenous organizations submitted two declarations of principles that, in 
their view, should constitute the basis for future discussions.17 Crucially, both 
declarations expressly affirmed, in their initial paragraphs, that indigenous peoples 
had the right of self-determination. The message for governmental delegates sitting at 
the negotiating table was clear: self-determination was the central pillar upon which 
the Declaration should be constructed, and could not be restricted in any meaningful 
way. This was so because for indigenous peoples any limitation to this right would 
amount to an infringement of the principle of equality. More precisely, to qualify the 
indigenous right of self-determination would be tantamount to creating two distinct 
rights of self-determination for two different kinds of peoples: all peoples, on the one 
hand, and indigenous peoples, on the other.  
 The members of the WGIP did their best to meet the demands of the 
indigenous delegates, convinced that the declaration should reflect, inasmuch as 
possible, the primary aspirations of these peoples.18 It is, therefore, not surprising that 
the text of the draft declaration produced by this group in 1993 accommodated the 
claims of indigenous peoples to a considerable extent. For the purposes of this article, 
it should be stressed that Article 3 of the draft declaration unequivocally affirmed 
that: 
 
‘indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development.’  
 
Whilst this provision was certainly in line with the aspirations of indigenous groups, it 
hardly reflected the views of the majority of States, which had strongly questioned the 
way in which the text addressed the issue of self-determination.19 In particular, they 
maintained that the strong language of Article 3, coupled with the absence of any 
other qualifying passages in the document, posed too significant a threat to their 
territorial integrity. Interestingly, States were concerned about their territorial unity 
                                                
17 Reproduced in Erica-Irene Daes, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Background and Appraisal”, in S. Allen and A. Xanthaki (eds.), supra note 15, pp. 11-40.  
18 Erica-Irene Daes, “The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations to the Genesis 
and Evolution of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, in Claire Charters and 
Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds.), Making the Declaration Work: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2009) p. 74. 
19 Ibid., p. 68. 
despite the fact that, first, international law does not recognize a right of secession to 
sub-national groups, and, secondly, the vast majority of indigenous peoples do not 
seek to create their own State.20 These concerns, however, are not difficult to explain 
in light of the considerations made in the previous section with regard to the 
relationship between internal and external self-determination, on the one hand, and 
remedial secession, on the other. Furthermore, the mere fact that most indigenous 
groups do not have a secessionist agenda could hardly justify, from a State 
perspective, the incorporation of a straightforward provision on self-determination in 
the Declaration. First, while it is true that the majority of indigenous peoples do not 
aim to create their own State, some of them actually do seek to become independent.21 
Secondly, indigenous peoples have reluctantly spelled out their repudiation of 
secession as a means to exercise their right of self-determination. Instead, they have 
often, and more vaguely, observed that self-determination does not necessarily mean 
independence.22 Doubts as to the real aspirations of some indigenous groups, 
particularly from former British colonies, could also arise in light of the fact that these 
groups’ initial demands were for full self-determination, including a right to 
statehood. It was only at a later stage that they gave up these original claims in favour 
of less controversial requests for ‘internal’ self-determination.23 Whether this change 
reflects the actual aspirations of the groups concerned is a question that States needed 
to address carefully.  
 The final, important, reason why States feared the consequences of an 
unqualified endorsement of self-determination, despite the ‘guarantee’ that indigenous 
peoples would not use it to claim a right to independence, is that other sub-national 
groups could have exploited it in an attempt to validate their secessionist claims. 
Contrary to indigenous peoples, many sub-national groups have open secessionist 
aspirations and work towards their realization.24 As they live in a large number of 
States, it is not surprising that previous attempts to confer on them not only a right to 
                                                
20 See, for one, James Anaya, “The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-determination in the Post-
Declaration Era”, in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds.), supra note 18, p. 185. 
21 John Henriksen, “Implementation of the Right of Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples within 
the Framework of Human Security”, at http://www.iwgia.org/human-rights/self-determination (visited 
3 August 2011).  
22 See, for example, Report of the WGIP on its first session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33 (25 
August 1982), para. 72.  
23 Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Rights, Culture, Strategy (2010) pp. 
151 and 152. 
24 See, for example, Geert Van Cleemput, “Clarifying Nationalism, Chauvinism, and Ethnic 
Imperialism”, 12 International Journal on World Peace, (1995) pp. 59–97. 
self-determination but also autonomy have been regularly rejected.25 Against this 
background, the decision to endorse an indigenous right of self-determination, 
especially an unqualified one, could have had potentially destabilizing effects on the 
internal situations of a substantial number of States. 
 The above considerations highlight the evident conflict of interest between 
States’ and indigenous peoples’ representatives during the negotiating process. While 
indigenous peoples had strong reasons, both from a moral and historical perspective, 
to claim a full right of self-determination, States had legitimate concerns with regard 
to the potential implications of such claim. Following on the previous discussion, the 
next section will examine the way in which States, seeking a solution that could 
mitigate their concerns, approached the issue of self-determination during the second 
part of the drafting process of the UNDRIP. 
 
 
3. The Gradual Restriction of the Indigenous Right of Self-Determination  
After adopting it, in 1994, the UN Sub-Commission for Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities sent the text of the draft declaration produced by the 
WGIP to the Human Rights Commission (the Commission). Acknowledging that 
States had serious concerns about this text, the Commission decided to set up a 
subsidiary body, the Working Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD), with the sole 
purpose of further elaborating the document produced by the WGIP. To be sure, self-
determination was not the only critical issue.26 The fact that the WGDD took more 
than a decade before submitting a final text to the Human Rights Council (which had 
in the meantime substituted the Human Rights Commission) indicates that States’ and 
indigenous peoples’ representatives disagreed on a larger number of issues. Among 
those, however, self-determination was the most controversial. In fact, as the WGDD 
began its annual meetings, it became clear that the draft declaration’s approach to 
                                                
25 See Will Kymlicka, “Beyond the Indigenous/Minority Dichotomy?” in Stephen Allen and Alexandra 
Xanthaki (eds.), supra note 15, pp. 192-195. In this regard, it is also interesting to compare the 
progressive content of the UNDRIP with that of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by GA Resolution 
47/135 of 18 December 1992. 
26 Among the critical issues on which the negotiators most strongly disagreed one should mention the 
question of definition, the right to collectively own ancestral lands, and the right to control the 
resources pertaining to these lands. For a detailed analysis of the history of the Declaration, see 
Stefania Errico, “The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Overview” and 
“The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is Adopted: An Overview” 7 Human Rights 
Law Review (2007) pp. 741-759. 
self-determination needed to be revised in order to safeguard the final adoption of the 
text.  
 As discussed in the previous section, the majority of States felt that Article 3 
posed too serious a threat to their territorial integrity. A group of States, taking a more 
radical position, opposed the very idea of recognizing the right of self-determination 
to indigenous peoples.27 Another group, larger in number, took a more progressive 
approach. Crucially, they were prepared to recognize that indigenous peoples had the 
right of self-determination. However, they were also concerned about the way in 
which the draft declaration dealt with this right. Accordingly, in order to preserve the 
strong language of Article 3, they requested that additional paragraphs aimed at 
clarifying the meaning of indigenous self-determination be included in the text.28 In 
particular, they suggested the introduction of specific passages on the inviolable 
principle of territorial integrity, and the promotion of a combined reading of former 
Article 31 (now Article 4) on the right to autonomy and Article 3.29 As a result of 
these changes, the indigenous right of self-determination would be essentially equated 
with ‘internal’ self-determination, despite Article 3’s literal endorsement of a full 
right.30 Although many indigenous representatives were willing to discuss some of 
these proposals, a final agreement could not be reached. This is so because the 
proposed amendments would ultimately qualify, either directly or indirectly, the 
indigenous right of self-determination, something which indigenous peoples had 
always resisted. 
 As the positions of governmental and indigenous delegates remained 
substantially distant, the Chairman of the WGDD, Luis Enrique Chavez, presented his 
own proposal in a final attempt to promote a constructive dialogue between the 
parties.31 While sharing the indigenous peoples’ view that Article 3 should remain 
untouched, Luis Enrique Chavez introduced two amendments in connection with self-
determination. The first change concerned one preambular paragraph of the draft 
                                                
27 See, for example, Report of the WGDD in its First Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84, paras. 43 and 
44. 
28 See, for example, Report of the WGDD in its First Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/84, paras. 45-48; 
and Report of the WGDD in its Fifth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84, para. 83. 
29 Article 4 of the UNDRIP reads: ‘indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.’ 
30 See for example the statements of Mexico, Bangladesh, Norway, Spain, and Russia. Report of the 
WGDD in its Sixth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/85, paras. 64, 69, 82, 83, and 90.  
31 Report of the WGDD in its Eleventh Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79, Annex I, Revised 
Chairman’s Summary and Proposal, Article 3. 
declaration, which established that ‘nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny 
any peoples their right of self-determination.’ In the Chairman’s proposal, the passage 
‘exercised in conformity with international law’ was added to the relevant paragraph. 
The intention of the Chairman was to introduce an indirect reference to the principle 
of territorial integrity. States, however, would have welcomed a direct and express 
reference to this principle. 
 The second, and more significant, change consisted of moving the provision 
on the right to autonomy, originally included in Article 31 of the draft declaration, 
directly after Article 3.32 The repositioning of this provision obviously aimed at 
promoting a combined reading of the two articles, suggesting that the indigenous right 
of self-determination should be read essentially as a right to autonomy. That said, it is 
not difficult to understand why this amendment alone could hardly satisfy the more 
diffident States. If indigenous self-determination really meant nothing more than 
autonomy, then the very existence of Article 3 would become superfluous. Instead, 
the co-existence of these two provisions could suggest that, although the indigenous 
right of self-determination should be substantially implemented by means of 
autonomous settings, it transcends the limited scope of autonomy. 
  Despite acknowledging that a number of States were not fully satisfied with 
his proposal, the Chairman of the WGDD decided to submit his revised version of the 
draft declaration to the Human Rights Council, which adopted it on its first session in 
June 2006.33 Regrettably, the text could not be adopted by consensus.34 It is telling 
that, in their explanations of the vote, several States made direct references to Article 
3, either expressing their concern with this provision, or specifying the way in which 
they understood it. All this clearly indicated that the question of self-determination 
had yet to be fully resolved. 
 
                                                
32 It should also be noted that, whereas the original version of the article used the expression ‘as a 
specific form of exercising their right to self-determination’, the final wording of Article 4 preferred 
the expression ‘in exercising their right to self-determination’, thus promoting a more restricted reading 
of the right. 
33 Human Rights Council Resolution 2006/2 of 29 June 2006. 
34 In favour: Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, 
Zambia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, 
Germany, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico; Against: Canada, Russian 
Federation; Abstentions: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Senegal, Tunisia, Ukraine. Other States that were against this text were not represented at 
the Human Rights Council. 
3.1 The Solution: Article 46(1) 
In view of the above considerations, it is clear that, when the text of the declaration 
reached the General Assembly, there existed a certain discrepancy between the way in 
which the majority of States understood the indigenous right of self-determination, 
and the way in which this right was articulated in the document. More precisely, 
whereas States had made it very clear during the sessions of the WGDD that they 
could only accept indigenous self-determination inasmuch as this meant ‘internal’ 
self-determination, the text of the declaration endorsed an unqualified version of the 
right that made no distinction between its internal and external dimensions.35  
 Against this background, while the text was discussed at the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly, the African Group of States asked and obtained the re-
opening of the negotiations.36 The position of the African States was clear: their 
support for the declaration depended on the inclusion of an explicit reference to the 
principle of territorial integrity. In light of the discussion conducted above, it is 
evident that other States were at least sympathetic to this request. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand were behind the African 
opposition.37 As a result of last-minute consultations, a crucial amendment was 
introduced in relation to the issue of self-determination. While Article 3 remained 
unchanged, the final version of Article 46(1) of the UNDRIP was altered to include 
the reference to territorial integrity that several States had repeatedly demanded. The 
final version of Article 46(1) now reads: 
 
 
‘[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
peoples, group or person any right to engage in any activities or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, or construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in 
                                                
35 For this reason, it could be anticipated that some States would ask for the incorporation of additional 
amendments. See, Luis Enrique Chavez, “The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Breaking the Impasse: the Middle Ground”, in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds.), supra 
note 18, p. 105. 
36 Namibia, on behalf of the African Group of States, introduced a resolution to ‘defer consideration 
and action on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to allow for further 
consultations thereon.’ Namibia: Amendments to Draft Resolution A/C.3/61/L.18/Rev.1, 21 November 
2006, A/C.3/61/L.57/Rev.1, adopted by a vote of 82 in favour, 67 against with 25 abstentions. 
37 See, for example, Jennifer Preston, Report to FWCC 22nd Triennial, Quaker Work on the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, July 2007, available at 
http://cfsc.quaker.ca/pages/documents/ReporttoFWCC.pdf (visited 21 April 2011). 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.’38 
 
 
3.2 Assessing the Indigenous Right of Self-determination 
It is clear that Article 46(1) has significantly restricted the scope of the right of self-
determination in the UNDRIP. Borrowing Koivurova’s words, ‘[while] the right to 
self-determination of indigenous peoples is recognized in Article 3 … its outermost 
scope is limited in Article 46.’39 Seen from a narrow perspective, this suggests that the 
UNDRIP has hardly ‘revolutionized’ the meaning of self-determination under 
international law. As discussed in section one, despite the uncertainties surrounding 
the scope of this right, one thing has always been fairly clear, namely that sub-
national groups do not have a right to independence. In this respect, the UNDRIP has 
simply reaffirmed this basic principle. The wording of Article 46(1), the broader 
normative context of the Declaration, and, crucially, its preparatory works all indicate 
that indigenous peoples do not have a right to secession. 
 Having said that, the UNDRIP’s approach to self-determination is obviously 
innovative in another important respect. This instrument has created an indigenous-
specific right of self-determination.40 The two key features of this right are that, first, 
it only applies to indigenous peoples, and, secondly, it does not include a right to 
independence. These restrictions clearly respond to the concerns of States that were 
highlighted in section two above. Whilst their significance should not be overlooked, 
the fact remains that the UNDRIP has broken new ground in the international law of 
self-determination. In fact, regardless of the limitations placed by Article 46(1), the 
UNDRIP is the first international legal instrument to have explicitly extended the 
right of (internal) self-determination to a sub-national group. As to the specificity of 
this right, it is apparent that the provisions of the UNDRIP are only meant to apply to 
a particular category of sub-national groups, that is, indigenous peoples. 
Consequently, it is difficult to anticipate whether, and, more importantly, to what 
extent, this normative development could influence the relationship between self-
                                                
38 Emphasis mine. 
39 Timo Koivurova, “Sovereign States and Self-Determining Peoples: Caring Out a Place for 
Transnational Indigenous Peoples in a World of Sovereign States”, 12  International Community Law 
Review (2010) p. 203. 
40 Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights (2002) p. 385. 
determination and other sub-national groups. Despite these reservations, there is no 
doubt that the UNDRIP should be welcomed as a positive development by those who 
advocate the emergence of new, contemporary, and dynamic forms of self-
determination.41  
 Once established that the indigenous right of self-determination has an internal 
dimension,42 it is important to shed some light on the actual meaning of this right. 
Before doing so, however, one final point remains to be considered. While it is fairly 
evident that the UNDRIP does not confer on indigenous peoples a right to 
independence under ‘normal’ conditions, could it be argued that it does so under 
‘special’ circumstances? Section one above highlighted that the existence of a right to 
remedial secession under current international law is at best doubtful. By discussing 
the way in which the UNDRIP approaches this issue, the next section will also 
examine whether this instrument has made any significant contribution to the current 
debate concerning this controversial right.  
 
 
4. The UNDRIP and Remedial Secession 
There is considerable support among academics for a last measure right of remedial 
secession in case of serious violations of human rights.43 A number of judicial and 
quasi-judicial pronouncements have also referred to this possibility, contributing to 
the perception that this right is gaining increasing recognition at the international 
level.44 However, it can hardly be said that a right of remedial secession for sub-
national groups exists under current international law. On the one hand, the normative 
foundations of this right are not well defined, while, on the other, States practice does 
not provide clear support for it.45 With regard to the latter point, it should be noted 
                                                
41 Gerry Simpson, “The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age”, 32 
Stanford Journal of International Law (1996) pp. 255-286. 
42 For a discussion of forms of external self-determination other than independence (and, therefore, less 
controversial) see Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights and United Nations Standards: Self-
Determination, Culture and Land (2007) pp. 169-173. 
43 See the discussions in, Peter Hilpold, “The Kosovo Case and International Law: Looking for 
Applicable Theories”, 8 Chinese Journal of International Law (2009), pp. 55-56; Helen Quane, supra 
note 15, p. 261. See also the Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Conflict in Georgia, p. 141, at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html. (visited 3 August 2011). 
44 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. 
No. 75/92 (1995), and Reference re Secession of Quebec, Supreme Court of Canada, [1998] 1 SCR 
217. See also the Separate Opinions of Judges Yusuf, para. 11 and A.A. Cancado Trindade, paras. 178-
181 in the Kosovo’s Opinion, supra note 5. 
45 Kosovo’s Opinion, supra note 5, para. 82. 
that political considerations inevitably influence States’ decisions in this complex area 
of international relations. This factor plays against the formation of a clear and 
coherent behavioural pattern, as confirmed by recent political developments.46  
 As to the former point, it is often said that a right of remedial secession finds 
its legal basis in the so-called ‘safeguard’ clause inserted in the 1970 UN Declaration 
on Friendly Relations.47 Paragraph 7 of principle V of this instrument establishes that: 
 
‘Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.’48 
 
This clause seems to provide only a conditional protection to the principle of 
territorial integrity of States. In practical terms, this means that if a government 
systematically oppressed a sub-national group living within its territory, the principle 
of territorial integrity could not be legitimately invoked. Accordingly, the sub-national 
group concerned would have, if it wished, a right to become independent and create 
its own State. However, it has been noted that the drafting history of this provision 
does not suggest that States intended to confer a right to remedial secession on sub-
national groups.49 This, coupled with the lack of coherence in State practice, suggests 
that a right to remedial secession as such has yet to materialize under international 
law. For the purposes of this article, it is important to establish whether the UNDIRIP 
takes an innovative approach to this issue, and whether, in doing so, it contributes in 
any meaningful way to the process of emergence of this right.  
                                                
46 Christopher Borgen, supra note 14. 
47 Among others, Robert McCorquodale, supra note 8, pp. 879-880; Antonio Cassese, supra note 8, pp. 
118-120; James Crawford, supra note 1, pp. 56-57. See also the separate opinions of Judges Yusuf and 
A.A. Cancado Trindade in the Kosvo’s Opinion, supra note 44. 
48 Emphasis mine. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of United Nations, GA Resolution 2625 
(XXV). 
49 On this point see, among others, Tamara Jaber, “A Case for Kosovo? Self-determination and 
secession in the 21st Century”, 15 The International Journal of Human Rights (2011) pp. 936-937; 
Peter Hilpold, supra note 43, p. 56; James Summers, “The Right of Self-Determination and 
Nationalism in International Law”, 12 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2005) pp. 
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 The first point that needs to be made is that the UNDRIP makes no express 
reference to remedial secession. Nevertheless, there are a number of passages within 
the text that may help to shed light on the Declaration’s approach to this controversial 
issue. Article 46(1) offers some initial guidance in this respect. It should be recalled 
that this provision establishes that: 
 
‘[n]othing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, 
peoples, group or person any right to engage in any activities or to perform any 
act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, or construed as authorizing 
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.’ 
 
As one can note, this passage resembles the safeguard clause contained in the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations that was discussed above. However, contrary to the 
latter, Article 46(1) provides for no exception to the protection of the principle of 
territorial integrity. Crucially, the reference to the obligation of a government to 
‘represent the whole people of the territory’ is absent. Accordingly, it could be argued 
that Article 46(1) de facto rules out the possibility that indigenous peoples have a 
right to remedial secession.50 This conclusion, however, is not fully convincing. 
 A first complication derives from a reference found in the preamble to the 
Declaration. More precisely, preambular paragraph sixteenth acknowledges that, in 
accordance with, inter alia, the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
(Vienna Declaration), all peoples have the right to self-determination.51 Crucially, the 
Vienna Declaration includes and expands the safeguard clause found in the 1970 
Declaration on Friendly Relations. After recognizing that all peoples have the right to 
self-determination, it establishes that: 
 
                                                
50 One could also argue that if, as noted above, the safeguard clause included in the 1970 Declaration 
on Friendly Relations cannot be taken to indicate the existence of a right to remedial secession for sub-
national groups, in the same way the lack of a reference thereto cannot be taken to indicate the 
exclusion of such right. However, since this safeguard clause is widely regarded as the legal basis for 
the right to remedial secession, it is appropriate to discuss it in the context of a potential right to 
remedial secession for indigenous peoples.  
51 ‘Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-
determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.’ A/CONF.157/24(Part I) Chapter III. 
‘In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a 
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction of any kind.’52 
 
In other words, the safeguard clause that was not directly included in Article 46(1) has 
been brought within the normative context of the UNDRIP by means of a preambular 
paragraph. The co-existence of Article 46(1) and preambular paragraph sixteenth 
sheds some doubts as to the UNDRIP’s overall position with respect to a right to 
remedial secession. While it could be argued that the wording of Article 46(1) carries 
more weight than the indirect reference found in preambular paragraph sixteenth, it 
should be remembered that preambles form integral part of their respective 
instruments for interpretation purposes.53 Furthermore, it should be stressed that 
Article 46(1) does not explicitly exclude remedial secession.   
 Another consideration that needs to be made is that the right of self-
determination is part of the international human rights framework. While the denial of 
a right to secession under ‘normal’ circumstances may be regarded as an acceptable 
limitation to the right, it is more difficult to argue the same point with regard to 
‘special’ circumstances. A human rights approach to this question would suggest that 
sub-national groups should have a right to remedial secession when this may serve the 
purpose of preventing or putting an end to widespread human suffering. 
 In conclusion, the presumption, based on the language of Article 46(1), that 
the UNDRIP categorically excludes a right to remedial secession is open to question. 
At the same time, it is relatively clear that the Declaration does not make any positive 
contribution to the process of emergence of this right under international law. In a 
sense, it can be argued that the UNDRIP eschews any direct engagement with this 
                                                
52 Emphasis mine. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, para. 2(3). 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  (23 May 1969), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 
p. 331, Article 31. This is a rule of the so-called law of treaties. Arguably, it can also be applied to 
other instruments, especially when they display a number of features typical of treaties. 
right, leaving practically unchanged its status under current international law. 
 
 
5. The Internal Dimension of the Indigenous Right of Self-Determination 
Once established that indigenous peoples have the right to internal self-determination, 
the next, difficult, step consists of implementing this right. It is generally recognized 
that courts and court-like bodies can importantly contribute to the process of 
implementation of international human rights norms and standards.54 This process can 
be substantially facilitated by the existence of identifiable yardsticks against which to 
measure the level of compliance with a human rights provision. In this sense, the way 
in which self-determination is understood bears important consequences for its overall 
effectiveness.  
 Having said that, to identify the exact, and practical, meaning of the 
indigenous right of self-determination is no easy task. This right has been defined, 
among others, as the right of indigenous peoples to ‘freely pursue their political, 
economic, and social developments within the frameworks of their respective 
States.’55 Evidently, the scope and implications of such a broadly defined right can be 
extensive and particularly difficult to spell out. In addition, a certain degree of 
flexibility is required in light of the heterogeneous category of indigenous peoples. 
Realistically, the way in which self-determination is exercised by the various 
indigenous groups of the world will have to take into account the important historical, 
political, and socio-economic differences that exist among them.56 Indeed, it has even 
been suggested that the implementation and application of Article 3 of the UNDRIP 
not only cannot but also should not be uniform.57 The need to approach the 
indigenous right of self-determination with a certain degree of flexibility does not 
necessarily have negative consequences on its effectiveness, provided that a common 
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strategy underpins its implementation. In light of the all above, recognizing the 
important relationship between internal self-determination and participatory rights 
may represent a promising solution.  
 Considerable support exists in academic writing for associating internal self-
determination with the ‘democratic entitlement’.58 Within this context, more specific 
suggestions have been made to understand the right of internal self-determination as 
the right of peoples to take part in decisions affecting their lives. Klabbers, for one, 
has pointed out that self-determination should be understood as a procedural right by 
virtue of which the ‘decisions affecting groups of people should be taken, at the very 
least, with those groups having being consulted.’59  This, in his view, does not mean 
that these groups should have an overriding right to veto, but, rather, that they ‘should 
be heard and … taken seriously.’60  
 The tendency to connect internal self-determination with participatory rights is 
also visible in the various components of the indigenous rights regime. The UN 
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,61 for example, has recently 
observed that ‘the principle of participation in decision-making … has a clear 
relationship with the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination.’62 More 
specifically, it also pointed out that self-determination is the normative framework for 
the indigenous collective right to participation.63 The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, has also recognized the important link 
between the two principles. Among other things, he regularly seeks to promote the 
participatory rights of indigenous peoples by reference to their right of self-
determination. Thus, relying on the self-determination framework, he has called upon 
States to promote broader cooperation with indigenous peoples in relation to 
extractive industries,64 to encourage indigenous self-governance at the local level,65 
and to guarantee the indigenous right to participate in State decision-making on a 
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Human Rights Quarterly (2006) p. 203. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Established, in 2007, pursuant to Human Rights Council, Resolution 6/36. 
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footing equal to that of all others.66  
 The connection between self-determination and participatory rights is nowhere 
clearer than in the UNDRIP, which, as noted by Burger, ‘is focused emphatically on 
the application of the right of indigenous peoples to participate.’67  More specifically, 
Quane has observed that the close relationship between self-determination and 
participation represents ‘one of the most interesting and innovative aspects of the 
UNDRIP.’68 In fact, more than twenty articles of the Declaration can be generally 
related to the idea of participation in decision-making.69 Among those articles, two are 
particularly significant in light of their general scope of application: Article 18, which 
establishes the right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect them, and Article 19, which requires States to consult and 
cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them. Another important provision is 
contained in Article 4, which describes autonomy as a specific way of exercising the 
indigenous right of self-determination.70 Autonomy can be in itself a complicated 
concept to define. In fact, as suggested by Heintze, its concrete content should be 
determined in every special case.71 However, the important point is that autonomy 
also represents a special form of participation, namely one that allows sub-national 
groups, in this case indigenous peoples, to exercise direct control over affairs that 
specifically affect them.72 
 The UNDRIP is not the only instrument concerning indigenous rights that 
recognizes a central position to the right of participation. Article 6 of International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 16973, notably the only international 
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binding instrument dealing specifically with indigenous rights, requires that 
indigenous peoples be consulted with regard to legislative or administrative measures 
that directly concern them. In a similar vein, Article 7 establishes, inter alia, that 
indigenous peoples shall participate in the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development which 
may affect them directly. It is telling that the supervisory bodies of the ILO have 
described the rights to consultation and participation spelled out in these articles as 
the cornerstone of Convention No. 169 upon which all the other provisions of the 
instrument are based.74  
 International human rights bodies that deal regularly with indigenous rights 
have also recognized the importance of participation for the effective protection of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. The Human Rights Committee has observed that the 
enjoyment of the right to culture included in Article 27 of the ICCPR may require 
positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective 
participation of indigenous communities in decisions affecting them.75 Similarly, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has urged States parties to 
ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of effective 
participation in public life, and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and 
interests are taken without their informed consent.76 
  Having said all that, it should be noted that, when approached from a different 
angle, the equation of internal self-determination with participatory rights appears less 
satisfactory.77 First, by focusing exclusively on participation, this solution ultimately 
validates the distinction between the right of self-determination of all peoples, on the 
one hand, and that of indigenous peoples, on the other. As was highlighted in section 
two, indigenous peoples’ representatives fought tirelessly at the negotiation table to 
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preserve the full recognition of their right of self-determination. An understanding of 
self-determination that not only fails to recognize their right to secession, but, also, 
downplays the relevance of their right to remedial secession may, therefore, be 
considered unfair.78 Secondly, and, perhaps, more importantly, some doubts may arise 
as to whether the connection between self-determination and participation effectively 
contributes to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and guarantee that their 
development will take place in accordance with their aspirations and needs. In other 
words, it is unclear whether indigenous peoples will be able to exercise these rights in 
any meaningful and fruitful way. 
 The above concerns are legitimate and cannot be simply dismissed. However, 
focusing on participatory rights seems to represent a valuable option within those 
realistically available. As discussed in section three, ways of exercising the right of 
self-determination that impair the political unity and territorial integrity of States are 
prohibited by Article 46(1) of the UNDRIP. However, it was also noted that the 
UNDRIP cannot be read as excluding a right to remedial secession altogether. 
Furthermore, the participatory rights recognized to indigenous peoples are different 
from those enshrined in other international human rights instruments. Firstly, they are 
more extensive, and, secondly, they are accepted as collective rights.79 These features 
crucially enhance the overall value of these rights. The legal regime that regulates the 
land rights of indigenous peoples offers a good example of how indigenous 
participatory rights, embedded in the self-determination discourse, can effectively 
work in practice. The next section will discuss this in relation to States’ obligations to 
engage in a constructive dialogue with indigenous peoples before launching or 
implementing development projects on their lands. 
 
 
5.1 The Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Context of Participatory 
Rights 
Indigenous peoples have a distinctive and profound relationship with their lands, 
territories and resources. This special relationship, aptly recognized under current 
international human rights law, must be specially protected in order to guarantee the 
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79 Helen Quane, supra note 15, pp. 259-287.  
continued survival and vitality of these peoples.80 Acknowledging the importance of land 
rights, a number of provisions of the UNDRIP deal directly with this issue, including 
Article 25 which establishes that indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their ancestral lands, and Article 
26 which recognizes their right to own, use, develop and control their lands, territories 
and resources.81 These provisions are vital, for, as indigenous peoples have repeatedly 
stressed, they need to control their lands in order to control their destiny.82 
 These provisions alone, however, leave a number of important questions 
partially unanswered, with potentially negative consequences for indigenous peoples. 
In particular, a conflict of interest emerges when States plan to exploit these lands and 
resources within the framework of national development programmes. In these 
situations, participatory rights represent an important tool at indigenous peoples’ 
disposal to resist States’ unduly interferences in their affairs.  
 Central to this question is the principle of free, prior, and informed consent 
(FPIC), which is virtually invoked by all bodies dealing with indigenous rights. FPIC 
may have significantly different implications depending on the way in which it is read 
and applied.83 At a minimum, it requires that, before implementing development 
projects on indigenous lands, States should consult the indigenous peoples concerned. 
At a maximum, it could mean that States should always obtain the consent of the 
group concerned before taking any action. It is, therefore, not difficult to understand 
the reason why indigenous peoples see FPIC as a vital manifestation of the exercise of 
their right to self-determination.84 As highlighted by Gilbert and Doyle, FPIC enables 
indigenous peoples to exercise control not only over their lands but also over their 
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destiny, a key component of the right of self-determination.85 
 The scope of FPIC, however, needs to be clearly defined in order for this 
principle to become operational. The UNDRIP contains a specific provision on the 
issue of land rights and State development projects. Applying the generic right of 
participation and consultation included in Article 19 to this particular situation, 
Article 32 of the UNDRIP establishes that: 
 
‘State shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain 
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting 
their lands or territories and other resources.’86  
 
The language of this article does little to elucidate the meaning of FPIC. Obviously, 
the rather elusive expression ‘consult in order to obtain’ lies at the core of the 
problem. Only an analysis of the drafting history of this provision, and its 
contextualization within the normative framework of the UNDRIP, can shed some 
light on the significance and value of this principle. 
 On the one hand, the possibility that FPIC confers on indigenous peoples an 
unqualified right to veto over any project affecting their lands should be excluded.  
During the negotiations on the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples’ representatives 
repeatedly stressed that they should be entitled to oppose unwanted development 
projects on their lands. Their view was reflected in the original version of Article 32 
included in the 1993 draft declaration, which affirmed that indigenous peoples had 
‘the right to require that States obtain their free and informed consent prior to the 
approval of any project affecting their lands, territories and other resources.’87 States 
strongly opposed this provision during the second stage of the negotiations, 
succeeding to amend its content. As noted above, the final version of Article 32 does 
not require that States obtain the consent of indigenous peoples, but, rather, that they 
consult them in order to obtain their consent.88   
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86  Emphasis mine. 
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 On the other hand, overly restrictive interpretations of FPIC should also be 
ruled out. One reason for this is that the requests advanced by a number of States to 
soften their obligations by, for example, using the expression ‘seek the consent’ as 
opposed to ‘obtain the consent’ were also dismissed. The language of Article 32 is 
clearly the result of a difficult compromise, and should, therefore, be read in 
accordance with its nature. Most importantly, however, too restrictive interpretations 
of FPIC would be incompatible with, generally, the normative framework of the 
UNDRIP, and, specifically, the content of Article 3. On the basis of the right of self-
determination, indigenous peoples have the right to freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. It seems difficult to reconcile this right with the fact 
that development projects could take place on indigenous lands without the consent of 
the indigenous peoples concerned, and regardless of the consequences that these 
activities could have on their cultures and lives. In this sense, as noted above, FPIC 
becomes both a requirement and a manifestation of the indigenous right of self-
determination. Accordingly, it must be read in such a way that prevents States’ 
interests from systematically and indiscriminately trumping the rights of indigenous 
peoples.  
 Importantly, a dynamic understanding of FPIC, which takes into account the 
interests and rights of indigenous peoples, is gaining increasing recognition at the 
international level. This understanding has its normative foundations in Article 32 of 
the UNDRIP, and has been further articulated by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, 
particularly the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Human Rights 
Committee.89 These bodies have promoted a ‘sliding scale approach’ to the question 
of indigenous participatory rights.90 Crucially, this approach is based on the key 
assumption that the ‘level of effective participation [that must be guaranteed to 
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indigenous peoples] is essentially a function of the nature and content of the rights 
and activities in question.’91 In other words, as observed by the Special Rapporteur on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
 
‘the strength or importance of the objective of achieving consent varies 
according to the circumstances and the indigenous interests involved. A 
significant, direct impact on indigenous peoples’ lives or territories 
establishes a strong presumption that the proposed measure should not go 
forward without indigenous peoples’ consent. In certain contexts, that 
presumption may harden into a prohibition of the measure or project in the 
absence of indigenous consent.’ 92 
 
This means that when a project is likely to have a major (negative) impact on the 
territories, lives, or cultures of indigenous peoples, States have a duty not only to 
consult them, but, also, to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent.’93 Thus, 
States may legitimately take steps to promote their economic development, but they 
must do so taking into account the rights of indigenous peoples,94 and particularly 
their right to self-determination, to own their lands, and to participate in the relevant 
decision making process.  
 In this sense, the principle of FPIC becomes a vital component of the 
indigenous right of self-determination, suggesting that strong participatory rights, 
operating within a solid indigenous rights regime, can bring important benefits to 
indigenous peoples. This is especially true considering the significance of land rights 
for these peoples, and the fact that, in the past, economic and industrial development 
took place without recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples’ cultural 
attachment to their lands.95 
 
 
 
                                                
91 Ibid., p.116. 
92 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
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6. Conclusions 
The right of peoples to self-determination is commonly described as one of the most 
controversial norms of international law. Two questions have traditionally dominated 
the intense debate concerning the scope and meaning of this right: first, who 
constitutes a ‘people’ for the purposes of self-determination, and, secondly, what does 
this right actually imply for its legitimate holders. These two questions become 
particularly relevant in the context of sub-national groups’ claims for self-
determination. Are these groups ‘peoples’ entitled to the right of self-determination? 
And, if so, do they have a right to secession? In the colonial context, this right 
certainly implied the possibility that specific categories of peoples, namely those of 
non-self-governing territories and those subject to alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation, could become independent. This, however, never meant that segments of 
a population were entitled to the same right. In the postcolonial period, the right to 
self-determination has been gradually recognized to all peoples, with a crucial 
distinction being introduced between an internal and external form of exercising such 
right. While self-determination continued to remain linked to independence, it also 
acquired a continuing character, so that peoples could exercise this right even within 
the existing borders of a State. This new development contributed, in part, to make the 
sub-national groups’ claims for self-determination more acceptable to States. 
However, States’ concerns about their territorial integrity have prevented a clear and 
definitive endorsement of self-determination for these specific groups. 
 Against this background, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) breaks new ground in the international law of self-determination. 
It is the first international legal instrument that expressly recognizes that one 
particular sub-national group, i.e. indigenous peoples, have the right of self-
determination. In accordance with traditional international law, the UNDRIP does not 
confer on these peoples a right to independence, although it leaves open the 
possibility that they may enjoy a right to remedial secession under extreme 
circumstances. Contrary to other sub-national groups, however, indigenous peoples 
are now entitled to a right of internal self-determination. This normative development 
suggests that new, contemporary, and dynamic forms of self-determination can 
emerge in response to the changing needs of the time, although it should be stressed 
that whether the UNDRIP will have significant implications for other sub-national 
groups remains to be seen.  
 If one focuses on the sphere of indigenous peoples, a number of conclusions 
can be drawn. The UNDRIP, in line with other instruments and bodies dealing with 
indigenous rights, promotes a vision of (internal) self-determination essentially 
connected with the principle of participation in the decision-making process. In other 
words, it empowers indigenous peoples by conferring on them a strong set of 
participatory rights that can be used, in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect, to 
engage in constructive dialogue with each respective State. This solution is promising 
in two main respects. First, it provides a fairly clear meaning of indigenous self-
determination. In this sense, courts and court-liked bodies will find it easier to 
determine whether States comply with their legal obligations. Secondly, it guarantees 
that, when dealing with indigenous issues, States take into account the needs and 
interests of indigenous peoples. That said, it is not difficult to appreciate that the 
equation of self-determination with participatory rights may appear unsatisfactory in 
other respects. First, it creates a specific-indigenous right of self-determination that is 
different from the classic right of self-determination enjoyed by all (non-indigenous) 
peoples. This is so because indigenous self-determination has been clearly construed 
as a right that does not imply a right to independence. Secondly, doubts may arise as 
to the effectiveness of participatory rights, and particularly whether they can 
guarantee that the dialogue between indigenous peoples and States will be on an equal 
footing. 
 All considered, there are reasons to believe that indigenous participatory 
rights, as understood in the UNDRIP in the context of self-determination, can produce 
some positive results. Firstly, the focus on participation does not necessarily imply the 
exclusion of other forms of exercising self-determination under special circumstances. 
More precisely, the text of the UNDRIP does not categorically rule out the possibility 
that indigenous peoples may enjoy a right to remedial secession. Thus, when 
participation cannot secure the respect of indigenous rights, more radical options can 
be explored. Secondly, participation can take different forms, including autonomy, 
which can offer valuable solutions to the problems of some indigenous groups. 
Thirdly, the participatory rights enshrined in the UNDRIP are different from those 
traditionally recognized in other human rights instruments. The former are more 
extensive and are accepted as collective rights. In this important sense, the separating 
line between participation and (internal) self-determination tends to dissolve.96  
 One specific area in which these rights have been particularly effective is that 
of land rights, which represent a fundamental aspect of the indigenous rights regime 
and of indigenous peoples’ lives. When States intend to launch development projects 
on indigenous lands, the UNDRIP requires them to consult the indigenous group 
concerned. More specifically, Article 32 refers to the principle of free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC), by virtue of which States should consult the group affected 
by the project in order to obtain its consent before taking any action. The principle of 
FPIC has been increasingly interpreted, by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, as 
requesting that projects should not go ahead without the consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned if they are likely to have a significant negative impact on their 
territories, lives and cultures. This means that States will have to respect the decisions 
of indigenous peoples in those cases in which the enjoyment of their rights could be 
seriously undermined by a development project. Considering the importance of 
ancestral lands for indigenous peoples, this represents a particularly positive 
development.  
 In conclusion, although self-determination as participation has some limits, 
one should recognize its potential in protecting and empowering indigenous peoples. 
While there is already evidence that this solution may bring some benefits to 
indigenous peoples, it is vital to monitor the future implementation of this right, both 
with respect to land rights and other areas of the indigenous rights regime, in order to 
preserve and further promote the continuation of this positive trend. 
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